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Inquiry, Relevance, Rules of
Exclusion, and Evidentiary Reform
D. Michael Risinger†
We are metaphorically assembled in this volume in
celebration of the career of Margaret Berger, whose ideas on
evidence and proof have enriched all of our work. Throughout
her career, she has been concerned with both the theoretical
and practical aspects of our enterprise as scholars. In such a
setting, I hope that a reverie on fundamentals, followed by a
modest call for reform, will not be looked upon as out of place.
It seems to me that there are some foundational issues
in regard to the very notions of relevance and of rules of
exclusion that can profitably be reexamined. First, I will
assume that the issue of “exclusion” of information will arise in
the context of an inquiry, that is, some human activity
undertaken to at least attempt a determination about an issue
for which the answer is initially unknown. Second, I will
assume that the issue involved is often (but not always)
properly characterized as an issue of fact in its most basic
sense, that is, a question the answer to which will be a
proposition about a specific empirically determinable1 state of
the world (assumed to be) exterior to human consciousness. It
is to such issues I will confine myself, at least initially.
In any situation fitting this description there will be a
human inquirer who, at the beginning of the process, is in a
poor state of knowledge, that is, the inquirer’s state of available
†

John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. An
early version of this paper was presented at the Miniforo on Legal Epistemology
organized by Larry Laudan and held at the National University of Mexico in June,
2008. I would like to thank Professor Laudan for inviting these reflections, and the
participants in the Miniforo on Legal Epistemology, particularly Ronald Allen and Erik
Lillquist, for stimulating further reflections. I would also like to thank Craig Callen,
Dale Nance, Roger Park, Charles Sullivan and Peter Tillers for very helpful comments
on drafts of this paper, and Lesley C. Risinger for the usual indispensible aid,
substantive and editorial.
1
By using the word “determinable” I do not mean to commit myself to any
strong claims about the perfection of knowledge, as will become obvious from the rest of
the paper.
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information is such that a finding2 concerning the fact in issue
would not be well-warranted. The point of the process is to
enable the inquirer to have the information necessary either to
make a properly warranted finding, or to conclude that such a
finding would not be properly warranted based on the
information obtained through the process.3
So far, we have not imposed any constraints upon the
process involved, beyond whatever is implied by the word
“process.” The process could be time-bound, or not. The process
could involve a single inquirer or a group. The process could
require the declaration of a conclusion, or not. The process
could authorize the inquirers to obtain information
(investigate) themselves, or disable inquirers from so doing, in
whole or in part, after the process begins (thus splitting the
decisional aspects of an inquiry from the investigative
function). Such latter process would require or authorize
investigation by non-decisionmakers, with an eye to potentially
providing the results of such investigation to the
decisionmaker, whether or not the decisionmaker could also
investigate independently of others. It could allow some forms
of investigation but not others, or rule out of bounds some
forms of information.
This “ruling out of bounds” is the essence of an
exclusionary rule. It is in the context of an inquiry involving a
split between investigation and decision agents where we are
most used to seeing exclusionary rules advanced or attacked,
but the notion of an exclusionary rule is not theoretically
limited to this context. Of course there might be practical
constraints on inquirers making good faith efforts to follow
mandated exclusions in a unitary function inquiry. Indeed, in
the legal context, it is sometimes said that exclusionary rules
in unitary systems make no sense because judges must look at
the evidence to determine if they should not see it.4 But this
goes too far. They need not look at the content under all forms
of exclusionary rule. Sometimes they can merely look at the
package. A rule directing a judge to “consider nothing in
writing” would not necessarily expose a judge to any
2

I use the word “finding” and “determination” interchangeably.
The issue concerning how much information is enough for a properly
warranted finding in any given inquiry is a policy issue concerning the proper standard
of proof, to use the legal term. In many non-legal settings each individual may be free
to adopt whatever standard seems appropriate to them.
4
See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 47 (1997).
3
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information beyond the fact that a writing exists, before the
judge put the writing out of sight and out of consideration. Of
course, most proposed exclusionary rules are not like this, but
it is important to keep in mind that whether an inquirer is
exposed to proscribed information in the process of determining
its proscribed status falls along a continuum ranging from the
necessity of full exposure to a situation where very little
exposure is required, depending on the nature of the rule.
Which brings us to the question of what a “free proof”
process of inquiry without any exclusionary rules whatsoever
would look like.5 I take as my model of such a process an
inquiry by an individual into whether, say, other humans had
advance knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald’s intention to take
his Mannlicher Carcano rifle to work and attempt a shot at
John Kennedy from the 6th floor window of the Texas School
Book Depository on November 22, 1963.6 From the perspective
of this notional inquirer, the notion of pure free proof makes
sense. The inquirer is totally free to consider whatever the
inquirer believes to be information bearing on the inquiry, to
take as much time as necessary to come to a conclusion, to
come to no conclusion, or to any conclusion whatsoever, to any
degree of certainty that results from the process and the
5

I am here using the term “free proof” in what is probably its most
commonly assumed meaning in English, that is, in its strongest sense, the complete
absence of any rules of exclusion, and in a weaker sense, the absence of all rules of
exclusion except irrelevance. Deirdre Dwyer traces this use of the term to Thayer. See
Deirdre M. Dwyer, What Does It Mean To Be Free? The Concept of “Free Proof” in the
Western Legal Tradition, 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE 2 (2005),
available at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol3/iss1/art6/. The other dominant meaning of
the term refers to the unconstrained freedom of the factfinder to evaluate what is in
front of the factfinder in any way that seems best, unconstrained by any other
arrangements such as rules of fixed evaluation (corroboration, “half-proof” etc.),
presumptions, authoritative comments on inferential strength, whether mandated or
simply authorized, etc. I would prefer to call the latter “free inference.” (And, in fact,
this is better in line with post-revolutionary French terms that are the source concepts,
liberté des preuves for the first and liberté d’appreciation for the second. See id. at 7.)
“Free proof” in these terms thus concentrates in a legal context on the provision of
information (or asserted information) and “free inference” on the use of whatever
information is provided, so that free proof describes the freedom to proffer, and free
inference the freedom to evaluate what is proffered in any way that seems appropriate,
given the task to be undertaken by the factfinder (which in a legal setting would still
be defined by the substantive law through instructions). A further step, which might be
said to prevail in an extreme system of equity discretion, might be called “free decision”
(and might encompass such things as jury nullification), but that is way beyond the
scope of this paper.
6
For purposes of this little reflection, I am assuming (perhaps
counterfactually) that there is no reasonable controversy that Oswald did take his rifle
to work with an intent to take a shot at President Kennedy from the 6th floor of the
Texas Schoolbook Depository building on November 22, 1963.
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information discovered and considered. If the inquirer takes
ouiji board7 pronouncements as authoritative (relevant,
strongly probative) there’s no law (or a priori rule) against it.
If, on the other hand, the individual wishes to persuade
others of any conclusion reached, the individual would be welladvised to take into account the epistemic investments of the
target audience, because what the individual regards as
providing a strong warrant for the conclusion may not be so
taken by others. In that case, when the individual sets out to
persuade, or to provide a warrant seen as acceptable to the
audience, the audience may in practical terms impose a rule of
exclusion on the one seeking to persuade: no reference to ouiji
board results should be given, tendered, proffered, presented or
suggested.
Well, you might say, that would not be a systemic rule,
really, but a rule of persuasive or rhetorical prudence. And so it
would be, if the context involved were merely history as a
hobby, or a free intellectual pursuit. But now assume some
official action, which will benefit some and be a cost to others,
is made to turn on the results of the inquiry. Now there is more
at stake than merely personal investments (for one thing, the
newly imposed functional conditions require some time limits
for decision). It would seem that now there must be an officially
declared criterion of some sort concerning what is in bounds,
and what is out of bounds, as providing material for an
acceptable belief warrant. This circumstance is heightened in
any such process (which by definition involves conflicting
interests) in which representatives of the conflicting interests
are allowed to proffer information to the inquirer. Real free
proof would permit the destruction of functionally required
time constraints by filibuster, and in many cases one side
would have an incentive to undertake such a strategy.8
7

Otherwise known as a channeling board, spirit board, or talking board. I
have adopted the popular spelling “ouiji” (also sometimes spelled “weegee”), which
reflects the common pronunciation, in preference to the original spelling “Ouija,” which
is trademarked.
8
A similar observation was made in that classic of modern legal relevance
theory, George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 701
(1941). The James article is justly famous, being cited as a source for the approach of
FRE 401 in its Advisory Committee note, FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note,
among other things, and at 17 pages is one of the shortest law review articles of lasting
theoretical impact in the modern era. This is especially striking, considering the fact
that James was predominately a tax/estates and trusts practitioner who was only in
the academy (as an assistant professor at the University of Chicago) for less than five
years in his mid-30s, and that he only wrote two articles on evidence topics (out of 11
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Nor is it a simple solution to this problem to invoke the
concept of relevance as the sole criterion to be applied to items
claimed to be properly considered as “information” in such a
context, because relevance is a much more problematic concept
than most people realize. I think there are generally two
contrasting ways to approach the notion of relevance, which I
will call the “god perspective” and the “processor state
perspective.” From the god perspective, there is no limit to the
concept of relevance. Even if we conceive of a god-being who is
not in some sense omniscient to begin with, the minimum
assumption of the god perspective is that the god inference
maker knows all that is necessary to make as much accurate
inference as possible from any given item proposed for
consideration, and has no time or processing capacity
constraints.9 In such a circumstance, there is no obvious
stopping point between any piece of factual information and all
the facts that can be—the Laplacian hyper-inference grok.10
Everything becomes relevant to everything in a virtually
tautological sense,11 or at least there is no knock-down reason to
believe it doesn’t.12 So the god perspective on inference is, for
total, many of which were tax articles written after he returned to practice.) (Searching
his name as author in the Hein-on-Line journals database will confirm this.)
9
“Laplace probably had God in mind as the powerful intelligence to whose
gaze the whole future is open. See infra note 11. If not, he should have: 19th and 20th
century mathematical studies have shown convincingly that neither a finite, nor an
infinite but embedded-in-the-world intelligence can have the computing power
necessary to predict the actual future, in any world remotely like ours.” Carl Hoefer,
“Causal Determinism,” STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ONLINE,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/.
10
The word “grok,” signifying an immediate and perfect knowledge of one
thing derived from another (often empathetic subjective states between two
individuals) was coined by Robert A. Heinlein in his book STRANGER IN A STRANGE
LAND, but it has now made it into the OED.
11
Consider this from Laplace:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit
these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of
the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would
be present before its eyes.
PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, ESSAI PHILOSOPHIQUE SUR LES PROBABILITÉS (1814).
12
Laplacian “lockstep” determinism (also called causal, nomological, or hard
determinism) is a member of a family of philosophical problems (radical skepticism and
others) which are difficult or impossible to refute completely, but which virtually
nobody believes, at least in any operational sense. (For a recent examination of various
forms of determinism in light of the “determinism/free will” debate, see generally
DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003)). Perhaps needless to say, I do not
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any pragmatic human use (including use as a limitation on
filibuster), worthless,13 yet it is the stance that seems to be
assumed in many legal rules and discussions of inference,14
particularly rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
embrace Laplacian determinism, but I believe the mental experiment in the text which
assumes it is instructive nonetheless.
13
Another conceptual problem avoided by rejecting the god view is the
problem of what has been called “unknown relevance,” that is, evidence that is
“relevant” but whose “probative value [is] entirely unknown, at least to an ordinary
reasonable trier of fact.” Dale Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L.
REV. 447, 456 n.30 (1990); see also Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1021, 1029-30 (1977). In my view, such proffers, while perhaps potentially
relevant under other conditions, are simply “irrelevant” in any meaningful sense. This
can be an especial problem when legislatures, for whatever reason, attempt to declare
information categorically admissible when the covering generality connecting the
evidence to the desired conclusion would be in many or most cases unknown to judge
and jury alike, as in the case of the presumption of importation of marijuana from the
mere fact that a seized substance was identified as marijuana, which was one subject of
examination in United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). See Harold A. Ashford and D.
Michael Risinger, Assumptions, Presumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L. J. 165, 205-08 (1969).
14
This approach is sometimes referred to as the theory of “logical relevance”
(though why it is thought to be more “logical” than other approaches is not entirely
clear) and sometimes as the theory of “minimal relevance.” Professor Callen attributes
its initial explicit exposition to Professor George James, and the “minimal relevance”
terminology to Professor Tillers. See Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy:
Conditional Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1254
n.51, 1280 n.182 (2003). The limitlessness of “minimal relevance,” that is, relevance
when viewed as a quality of the relationship between a probans and a probandum in
the abstract, has been noted before, most specifically by Jerome Michael and Mortimer
Adler: “If the criterion of admissibility were simply relevancy, in the strict logical
sense . . . [then] nothing would be inadmissible since, as we have seen, nothing would
be irrelevant in that sense.” Jerome Michael & Mortimer Adler, The Trial of an Issue of
Fact: II, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1462, 1462 (1934). See the discussion in PETER TILLERS,
REVISER’S NOTE, § 37.3, IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1027-28 (Tillers rev. 1983)
[hereinafter TILLERS]. This limitlessness is mainly a product of two things: the first is
the likelihood that rational inference is best formally modeled by a structure where a
probans is related to a probandum by the “nomological glue” (to use Professor Tillers’s
term) of a covering generality of some sort. The second is the fact that the identity and
extent of such covering generalities in the universe is currently unknown (and, given a
variety of constraints flowing from the human condition, in principle unknowable), so
that the relevance of any probans to any probandum can never be said with certainty
not to exist as a function of a covering generality not currently known. The best
illustration of this inescapable problem that I am aware of comes from Professor Callen
(discussing it in the context of “conditional relevance”):
There are some situations in which our limited knowledge and cognitive
resources make relevancy of evidence conditional on information about
additional facts—regardless of whether we have a doctrine called conditional
relevancy. Suppose that D is accused of committing homicide by shooting. No
bullet has been recovered, nor did police find any trace of one at the scene of
the crime other than the wound. Evidence is offered that D used a number of
extremely cold substances in his laboratory research. On its face, that
evidence would be irrelevant to most people. That is, it seems unlikely that
there is any connection between murder by shooting, absence of a bullet, and
experience with extremely cold substances such as liquid nitrogen. If, on the
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The alternative notion of relevance takes into account
not only the information being proffered as relevant to some
other claimed fact, but also the characteristics of the processor
that will mediate between the initial information and the
asserted inference.15
Here we need to consider what we mean by
“information.” Information is something that interacts with a
decisionmaker (processor), broadly defined, which increases the
rational warrant for some decision or group of decisions over
potential rivals. Again, in approaching the concept of
information in this way, I am emphasizing that the status of a
stimulus as “information” is not inherent solely in the
stimulus. It is dependent upon the way the stimulus interacts
with the decisionmaker. Thus, whether a stimulus counts as
information is a characterization of its interaction with and
effect on a decisionmaker. No decisionmaker, no information,
although things in the world that are stimuli that potentially
could affect some decisionmaker under conditions not now
prevailing might be called “potential” information.16 Not only
does the status of something as information depend on its
interaction with a decisionmaker, it must interact in a specified

other hand, there were reason to believe that (i) one could shape some such
frozen gas to form a bullet, (ii) fire it from an air gun causing a fatal wound,
after which (iii) it would sublimate, then that would make D’s access to such
substances relevant. Admitting all proffered evidence on the theory that some
fact making it relevant might turn up would be incredibly wasteful.
Callen, supra, at 1278-79.
15
The Federal Rules of Evidence move all processor considerations to Rule
403, which I believe leaves almost nothing for Rule 401 to do on its own, at least if
applied as drafted. I am not the first to make this observation. See TILLERS, supra note
14, at § 37.2. (“[T]here are very few cases in which the exclusion of evidence can be
explained on the ground of irrelevance alone. This ironic result is the product of the
constricted exclusionary force of the legal principle of relevancy that arises from the
assumption that the only legally irrelevant evidence is that evidence that also happens
to be ‘logically’ irrelevant.” Id. at 1021.)
16
This definition of information proper, as distinguished from “potential
information,” was first suggested, sub nom. “actual relevance” and “potential
relevance” in D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and
“Legitimate Moral Force,” Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49
HASTINGS L. J. 403, 431-35 (1998). It differs from the definition of “information” used
in communication theory, where information is defined so broadly as to include both
what is here referred to as information proper, and also what is referred to as
“potential information.” See Warren Weaver, “Recent Contributions to the
Mathematical Theory of Communication,” in CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER,
THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949): “The word information in this
theory is used in a special sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In
particular information must not be confused with meaning.” Id. at 8.
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way. To count as information, it must both affect a decision,
and affect it in an accuracy-improving way.
By accuracy-improving, I mean that the stimulus must
reliably be the kind of stimulus that improves the likelihood of
the correspondence of a decision with the characteristics of the
exterior world (again, we are limiting ourselves to decisions
about facts, or to the fact component of more complex fact-value
decisions). By defining information in this way I realize that I
am making some fundamental commitments: first, to some
version of a theory of knowledge that has both probabilistic and
correspondence aspects; and second, to the proposition that
whether a stimulus is information depends both, and as much,
on the state of the decisionmaker as on the state of the
stimulus. I will not attempt a full-scale defense of the first
here, since I think that such an approach to knowledge is
inherent in most contexts (for instance, legal contexts) to which
I will apply the approach. The second requires both more
unpacking of its implications, and more defense.
One of the implications of a Laplacian determinist
account would be that, from the perspective of a being that
knew all the details of what was taken (by Laplace) to be a
fully specified formal system (and perhaps more), there is no
information in the sense I have defined it. As previously noted,
every stimulus entails immediate complete knowledge of all
other details of the system at all possible times past and
present. I will not burden the reader with a rehearsal of the
many problems of adopting this view as one that defines the
nature of some ultimate physical reality.17 But the mental
experiment entailed in considering this view results in one
important point. “Decisions” about states of the world can only
exist and be “informed” by “information” exactly because we
live in a world of imperfect knowledge where virtually
everything must be approached based on a probabilistic
evaluation of the interaction of stimuli we receive acting upon
the current states of our neural processors (that is, our
reactions to those stimuli, conscious, semi-conscious or
unconscious).
Something that is information in regard to a particular
issue is relevant to that issue. Something that is not
information is not relevant. If something is information it is
therefore evidence in the core sense, that is, it will affect the
17

See supra note 9.
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processor (decisionmaker) in a way that is a net benefit to
probabilistically better results, based on a pertinent evaluation
of the information (about which more later) Therefore, whether
something is relevant to a decision can only be determined by
knowledge or assumption concerning the characteristics of that
which is proffered (something claimed to be “evidence,” i.e.
relevant information) and the characteristics of the
decisionmaker, and the interrelationship between the two.
Consider this: a dog is caught on a ledge. He is skittish.
He may perform an act injurious to himself. Does this dog
make a decision when he moves? Assuming the answer is in
some sense yes, what stimulus could I give him that would
count as information relevant to his decision? Words in English
explaining the effects of falls from heights, or the value of
remaining calm, or the safest route off the ledge? If not, then
this illustrates the difference between potentially and usably
relevant information,18 and how the two are a function of both
the stimulus and the state of the putative decisionmaker.19
So something is usably (as opposed to potentially)
relevant information to a decision (that is, only then can it be
counted as information at all) only in regard to the
characteristics of the processer—is it the kind of information
that raises the likelihood of decisions that conform to exterior
empirical reality? I am not here making any claim about what
the characteristics of an ideal processor might be.20 The
18

Or, one might say more accurately, between stimuli that are candidates to
be considered information under different conditions than those currently prevailing,
and those that actually are information.
19
But if I hold out a steak to lure the dog off the ledge, have I in any sense
given him information that informs his decision about the problem of the ledge?
Whatever drives are behind his action, and however we might move away from purely
behavioral accounts to hypothesize an internal processing that might count as a
decision about the steak, his response would not seem, at least at first blush, to
represent a solution to the problem of deciding about ledge choices (except perhaps by
assuming some connection between approaching humans holding steak and something
counting as general trust).
20
Well, only very weak claims. It would seem that a stimulus that caused a
response that induced an action for reasons unrelated to the pending problem, as might
be the case in the dog example in note 19 supra, would not count as information even
though it caused something that might be labeled a decision that resolved the problem.
The steak resolved the problem, but not by providing an answer to an inquiry. Beyond
that, as Professor Tillers has warned us for years, it is incumbent on us not to confuse
our (current) models of ideal “rational” decision (which in themselves may turn out to
be less than ideal) with the way humans process information or make optimal decisions
about facts. See TILLERS, supra note 14, at 1017; see also Peter Tillers, Are There
Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and OntoEpistemology, in JOHN JACKSON, MAXIMO LANGER & PETER TILLERS, EDS., CRIME,
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS
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processor that counts is the processor we are ultimately stuck
with, that is, humans en grosse. So if humans do not conform to
an ideal processor, being just what they are and representing
the range that they do in terms of the range of neural processor
space and speed, prior experiences and heuristics, etc., then
rules of admission (and a fortiori, rules of exclusion) must be
fashioned with the best available information about these
characteristics in mind, and more such information should be
developed and considered for the improvement of that process
of decision.
Nothing I have said thus far is necessarily particularly
novel, of course.21 It is consistent with general notions

IN HONOR OF MIRJAN DAMASKA (2008). This is not to say that anything goes, or that
human mental processors can be neither criticized nor trained to be more accurate in
evaluation, but only that our natural modes, appropriately disciplined, may have
epistemic advantages over currently available theoretical models. See Callen, supra
note 14, at 1258-78. It seems to me that Daniel Dennett is right to say that whatever
thinking (especially inferential thinking) is, it is virtually certain to be some sort of
computational process—not one mimicking our current notions of ideal computation
perhaps, but rather one that maximizes the trade-off between computational accuracy
and efficiency through the use of modules, heuristics, and hierarchical selection of
preliminary results. See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED
(1991), particularly ch. 9, “The Architecture of the Human Mind,” at 253-82. It seems
also very likely that some of its heuristics are hard-wired, some come more-or-less
default wired subject to revision, while others really are the product of experience
repeated and internalized. These processes provide the generalities necessary to make
sense out of case-specific evidence, see WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 332-40 (2d ed. 2006), and create the implied reference classes
that make the problem of relevance not a purely logical exercise even after the
elimination of the god view. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The
Problem of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007).
It also seems reasonably clear that some of our processing structures,
heuristic, analogical and story-influenced as they appear to be, work well under some
conditions and less well under others, leading us predictably astray, for instance, in
attempting to play three-card monte. See D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three
Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some Lessons of
Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 193-210
(2002). I am inclined to evolutionary explanations for this state of affairs, but this is
controversial and unnecessary to the present paper. At any rate, our evidence rules and
practices should attempt to understand these conditions and take them into account.
21
Indeed, it resonates closely with many of the points made (in the context of
a discussion of “conditional relevancy”) in Craig Callen’s fine article, Conditional
Relevancy and Constrained Resources, supra note 14. Consider, also, the following from
Professor Allen, discussing the limitations of a pure Bayesian account of proof at trial:

Whereas under the unconditional probability assumption there are too
many possible accounts of reality, under the conditioned-on-trial-evidence
assumption there are too few—none actually. There are none because this
possibility suffers from an infinite regress of a different sort from the
unconditional probability assumption. The regress here comes from the fact
that evidence does not announce its own implications, those implications
emerge from the effort of human contemplation.
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concerning the implications of naturalized epistemology in the
Goldman vein22 applied to evidence law to be found, most
specifically, in Ronald Allen and Brian Leiter’s important
article in the Virginia Law Review in 2001,23 though I was also
moving in something of a similar direction myself somewhat
earlier.24
Allen and Leiter adopt the position that proper
rulemaking in a jury system requires the rulemaker to take
into account both “the epistemic frailties of jurors, and the
epistemic limits of rule-appliers [the “gatekeepers”], namely,
judges.”25 And later in the article they assert that the main
question to be asked in regard to any rule of inclusion or
exclusion is “an essentially empirical question: Does this rule of
inclusion or exclusion in fact increase the likelihood that
factfinders, given what they are actually like, will achieve
knowledge about disputed matters of fact?”26 They also appear
to adopt the primacy of information derived from formal
empirical studies as the main appropriate source of
information about those epistemic frailties, rejecting “rootless
theorizing” as too “a priori.”27 However, it seems to me that
their approach to the results of such studies, and to other
sources of relevant knowledge on the advisability of rules and

Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604,
613-14 (1994). This emphasis on the “effort of human contemplation,” developed at
various later points in the article, see, e.g., id. at 619-20, appears to be the same as an
emphasis, for purposes of relevance analysis, on the state of the humans doing the
contemplation, i.e., the factfinder(s).
22
See generally ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986).
23
Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1493-1503 (2001); see also Brian Leiter, The
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make
for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814-15 (1997).
24
See D. Michael Risinger, supra note 16, at 403, 431-46 (“The Relevance of
the Irrelevant”) (drawing the distinction between potential and usable relevance):
[Federal Rule of Evidence 401] declares evidence relevant if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence” without suggesting a referent to the trier of fact’s
rational capacities to derive or process the information. It emphasizes the
content of the code independent of the characteristics of the decoder.
Id. at 433 n.79; see also D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional
Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 518-20
(2000).
25
Allen and Leiter, supra note 23, at 1502 (quoting Leiter, supra note 23, at
814-15).
26
Id. at 1537.
27
Id. at 1521-26.
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rule changes, is so cautious that it just about rules out a
“naturalized” reform agenda.
The main tool Allen and Leiter use to arrive at this
position is the “external validity” play, although they don’t use
that label. Whenever formal data are derived from
experimental or quasi-experimental studies, even of the best
designed sorts, there is always an issue of how far the results
can be generalized to other universes of phenomena beyond the
exact set studied.28 This question is perhaps trivial in physics,
because of well-warranted assumptions of fungibility, but as
such fungibility assumptions become less and less tenable,
external validity concerns rise, and when we get to issues of
human behavior, these concerns are at their highest. Allen and
Leiter rightly recognize that there is always a question in
generalizing from behavior under simulated test conditions to
behavior under real world conditions, and that this may be
especially true when attempting to generalize to behavior
under the very unusual conditions presented by the context of a
jury trial. This can be seen as laudable cautious skepticism,
and I must say that as to each individual proposition
considered, I can view it that way myself. However, globally, I
can’t escape the feeling that they have set the bar too high. In
regard to the reform implications of the demeanor studies, they
accept the conclusions of Professor Wellborn that these studies
do not yet compel any specific changes in the current way we
do business.29 They then turn to two other areas, probabilistic
evidence and character evidence, which they say “cry out for
reform and/or additional research.”30 But in the end, after
looking at the condition of the empirical record and examining
it through their external validity lens, no suggestions for
possible reform are forthcoming.31
Now I concede that I am probably being a bit cranky
about this. The line between proper circumspection about
28

The locus classicus for the consideration of the problem (and the source of
the term) is the work of Donald T. Campbell. The most recent version of this work is to
be found in WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL
INFERENCE 83-93 (2002). Reflections on external validity issues in legal contexts can be
found in Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability:
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 25-28
(2003) and D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 782-88 (2007).
29
Allen & Leiter, supra note 23 at 1540-42.
30
Id. at 1542.
31
Id. at 1545, 1549.
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external validity and unreasonable status quo conservatism is
difficult and hardly self-defining. But I come to this writing
somewhat bent by watching the likes of Professor Ebbe
Ebbesen play what I consider to be a radically skeptical version
of the external validity card to aid various law enforcement
status quo conservatives in resisting needed eyewitness
identification reforms.32
In my view, what is needed for proper “naturalized
reform” of the law is a combination of formal empirical data
and critical common sense which can together form the basis
for wise choices. Common sense in this context refers both to
the sense of the world that humans obtain through the process
of lived experience, and to processes of critical evaluation
available in ordinary reflection and discourse that can be
brought to bear on both the products of the laboratory and the
less formal products of the laboratory of life.33 It is commonly
32

Professor Ebbesen is a social psychologist who teaches at the University of
California at San Diego. For a long time he has been one of the main prosecution
witnesses called in litigation across the country to resist the admissibility of testimony
of eyewitness researchers on the weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony
under various conditions. He has also been the go-to guy for providing academic
support for law enforcement resistance to changing the way that eyewitness
identification procedures are conducted and presented in court. See, e.g., United States
v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); People v. Smith, 784 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. LeGrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). He seems to
have been the main design consultant (if it can be called a design) for the Illinois
eyewitness study, the results of which were the basis of the infamous Mecklenberg
Report. For a full examination of the many weaknesses of the Mecklenberg Report, see
generally Daniel Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Identifications in
the Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2007). This evaluation was the product of a panel
assembled by John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The members of the panel were
Daniel Schacter, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University; Robyn Dawes, Queenan
Distinguished University Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow, American
Statistical Association; Henry L. Roediger III, James S. McDonnell Distinguished
University Professor at Washington University, former President, Association for
Psychological Science; Larry L. Jacoby, Professor at Washington University; Daniel
Kahneman, Professor of Psychology, Princeton University, 2002 Nobel Laureate in
Economics; Richard Lempert, Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan School
of Law, and Division Director for the Social and Economic Sciences at the National
Science Foundation, 2002-2006; Robert Rosenthal, Distinguished Professor at
University of California, Riverside, and Pierce Professor of Psychology emeritus,
Harvard University, Co-Chair Task Force on Statistical Inference, American
Psychological Association. For another evaluation of the Mecklenberg report, together
with a description of the kind of reform proposals regularly opposed by Prof. Ebbesen,
see generally Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinais, and Martin A. Safer, A
Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2007).
33
What I am embracing is a version of what C.S. Peirce referred to as
“critical common-sensism.” See Christopher Hookway, Critical Common-Sensism and
Skepticism, 24 NOUS 397 (1990). I am aware of the sizable literature on the notion of
common sense and its characteristics, strengths and weaknesses, although I must
admit that I have only scratched its surface. A good set of references, although
concededly now perhaps a bit dated, appears in Barry Smith, Formal Ontology,
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observed that common-sense inquiry and scientific inquiry are
not different in kind,34 and so it would hardly be surprising if a
program of naturalization would supplement formal data with
common-sense evaluation, since for most issues of interest for
purposes of the law, definitive formal data either cannot be
developed because of limitations on human research, or else
they must await programs of research stretching into the far
reaches of the future. Unless we supplement them with
common sense, we seem doomed to embrace the status quo
indefinitely.
In embracing a common sense component to a program
of naturalization, I am of course not really disagreeing with
either Professor Allen or Professor Leiter, since they have both
had positive things to say in the past about the role of common
sense in things legal and evidential.35 So where might a

Common Sense and Cognitive Science, 43 INT’L J. OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 641,
663-66 (1995); see also LYND FORGUSON, COMMON SENSE (1989).
34
See generally SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON (2003),
especially ch. 4, “The Long Arm of Common Sense.”
35
Consider this from Prof. Leiter:
I find a certain type of pragmatism attractive—indeed, unavoidable—
but it is both more modest and more radical than the apology for fuzziness
that masquerades as pragmatism in the law journals. This pragmatism is a
relative of the type one finds in philosophers like Carnap and Quine, and that
has entered the philosophical lexicon in the metaphor of “Neurath’s boat.”
The radicalism of this pragmatism resides in its recognition that the only
possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic norms—norms about what to
believe—are pragmatic: we must simply accept the epistemic norms that
work for us—that help us predict sensory experience, that allow us to
manipulate and control the environment successfully, that enable us to
“cope.” Pragmatic criteria are, at the limit, the only possible criteria for the
acceptance of epistemic norms precisely because we can’t defend our choice of
any particular epistemic norm on epistemic grounds ad infinitum. At some
point, we must reach an epistemic norm for which the best we can say is, “it
works.”
But which norms actually work for us? Take an example: “Don’t believe
in a hypothesis that figures in a non-consilient explanation of experience” is a
norm for belief—call it the “consilience” norm. A non-consilient explanation is
one that posits an explanans—the thing that does the explaining—that
seems too narrowly tailored to the explanandum—the event to be explained.
Here’s how this consilience norm works in our lives. Suppose while sitting at
home, all the lights in the house suddenly go out at the very same moment.
What fact about the world explains this?
Explanatory hypothesis number 1:
Conspiring leprechauns have simultaneously thrown all the light
switches in the house.
By contrast, explanatory hypothesis number 2 proposes that:
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combination of formal data and common sense insight take us?
Well, for one thing, I think that it would carry us toward
supporting most of the reforms in eyewitness procedures that
have been suggested by Gary Wells and others, perhaps along
something like the following lines:
1. There are a larger number of erroneous convictions
of factually innocent defendants than many believed or were
willing to admit until recently. (This is supported both by data
and by an examination of the statements concerning the rarity
There has been a general power failure, i.e., electrical current has
stopped entering the house.
Both explanatory hypotheses suppose an ontology: mischievous
leprechauns on the one hand; electricity, wires, and currents on the other.
But the appeal to leprechauns is non-consilient: it seems a gratuitous
ontological posit, precisely because supposing that leprechauns exist doesn’t
help explain anything else. Their existence doesn’t explain our
observations—we haven’t seen any—nor does it help explain the restoration
of power—we neither need to “exterminate” the leprechauns in order to
retain power, nor do we even need to turn on all the light switches they are
hypothesized to have flipped. By contrast, assuming the existence of electrical
currents proves a very fruitful ontological posit: it not only cues us to the
appropriate steps to take to restore power in the house, but it helps explain a
range of ordinary phenomena, like why the television goes off when
unplugged from the socket. Since the consilience norm favors the electricity
ontology over the leprechaun ontology, and since the former works better
than the latter, it appears that a good reason to accept the consilience norm
is because of its practical cash-value.
Indeed, the consilience norm—and its other relatives in a scientific
epistemology—have worked very well for us humans: they helped depopulate
our ontology of leprechauns and gods and ethers, and they are foundational
norms in scientific practice, a practice that sends the planes into the sky,
keeps the food from spoiling in the refrigerator, and alleviates human
suffering through modern medicine. From a philosophical standpoint, what
bears special notice is that the epistemic norms of common sense and the
epistemic norms of science are simply on a continuum.
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 267, 306-08 (1997) (citations omitted).
And this from Professor Allen:
There is plenty of work to be done figuring out how people reason, and
particularly how they reason about legal affairs, even if we do not pursue
these matters with the equivalent of highly general, top-down scientific
theories or the tools of postmodern French literary theory. However, even if
the fun quotient does go down, the significance quotient may go up. As the
sociologist Lindenberg said: “Common sense finds its way into a body of law if
it has a strong influence on social relations; central to all of these is the body
of law governing evidence . . . . The body of law governing evidence may be
the strongest bastion against sudden assaults on common sense.” I would add
that resisting sudden assaults on common sense may be one of the most
important guarantors of the continuing progression of civilization.
Ronald J. Allen, Common Sense, Rationality and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1417, 1430-31 (2001) (citations omitted).
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of such events over time, which I guess is another form of
data.36)
2. Laboratory data suggests that humans are
vulnerable to a variety of influences that lead to erroneous
selection of innocent persons as the perpetrators of crime in a
non-trivial number of cases, generally involving stranger-onstranger identifications.37 This result is not particularly
surprising from a critical common-sense perspective.
3. Data from other studies indicate that humans tend
to over-value eyewitness identification,38 especially if
confidently given, even though confidence is not necessarily a
good predictor of accuracy under many conditions.39 This result
also does not appear to be surprising from a critical common
sense perspective.
4. Data from other sources (examination of the records
of DNA exonerations) indicates that erroneous eyewitness
identification is the single most common factor involved in such
cases.40 This is also not particularly surprising.
5. Data from laboratory studies point to ways of
conducting criminal investigations involving eyewitness
36

See generally Risinger, supra note 28, at 765-68 et passim.
The literature on eyewitness identification research and its results is vast.
A good starting point is Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 (2006).
38
See generally R.C.L. Lindsay, Expectations of Eyewitness Performance:
Jurors’ Verdicts Do Not Follow from Their Beliefs, in ROSS ET AL., ADULT EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1994).
39
Id.; see also, e.g., Siegfried L. Sporer, Choosing, Confidence and Accuracy:
A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Studies, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 315 (1995).
40
BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000)
(app. 2, tbl. 2, providing an analysis of 62 DNA exoneration cases showing inaccurate
eyewitness identifications in 84% of the cases); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler,
The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005)
(analysis of 86 DNA exoneration cases showing inaccurate eyewitness identifications in
71% of the cases); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78
(2008) (analysis of 200 DNA exonerations showing inaccurate eyewitness
identifications in 79% of the cases). The exact implications of these statistics are not
clear and must be approached with caution. As Roger Park has pointed out, in a set of
cases proved by DNA to be factually wrong, and made up largely of stranger rape cases,
the statistic could hardly be otherwise, and taken by itself it is weak evidence that
eyewitness identifications are especially unreliable. See Roger C. Park, Eyewitness
Identification: Expert Witnesses Are Not the Only Solution, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
305, 305-06 (2003). This is of course another variation of the “denominator problem.”
Without a reference class in which both the number of accurate and inaccurate
eyewitness identifications is known, it is not possible to derive a rate of inaccuracy.
However, the DNA data are hardly inconsistent with the general claim that eyewitness
identifications are surprisingly unreliable, a claim that predates DNA exonerations
significantly. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 516 (1890), Great
Books Edition (1952).
37
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identifications that significantly reduce the likelihood of
erroneous identifications of innocent suspects.41 Some of these
suggestions are, when examined in a critical common sense
fashion, virtually cost free both as to monetary costs and costs
in lost identifications of the guilty that are at all epistemically
defensible to begin with. In such circumstances, such reforms
should be undertaken.42
Let me expand on the latter point. What I am referring
to is the adoption of a requirement that all pre-trial
identification procedures (photo-spreads and corporeal lineups) be administered by someone who does not know which
person in the array is the suspect and which is a filler, that is,
the so-called “double blind”43 administration of the
identification procedure. While it is possible to argue that other
proposed reforms (such as sequential viewing to reduce
selection by “relative judgment”) may have a cost in reducing
some epistemically warranted accurate identifications, such an
effect is not possible in regard to the masking of
administrators. No one has yet come up with an argument that
plausibly suggests how it could be that identifications which
result solely from the administrator cueing, whether conscious
or unconscious, and which would not be made by the witness
independent of this variable, have any epistemic justification at
41

See Wells, supra note 37.
The presentation in the text should not be read to mean that I do not think
that other aspects of the reform proposals should not be adopted. I selected the double
blind aspect as the easiest to use as a clear illustration. Beyond that, for instance, I
believe that a strong case can be made for adopting sequential presentation, even
though the loss of selections which results from a sequential presentation can be more
easily argued to represent the loss of a certain percentage of epistemically justified
“accurate” identifications of true perpetrators. The set of identifications lost at the
margin between simultaneous presentation procedures and sequential procedures is
not large, and is likely to be rich in non-perpetrator selections, or false positives. The
ratio of lost true positives to lost false identifications seems likely to be small enough to
count as an acceptable cost for the reduction in innocents convicted under virtually any
justifiable approach to such a “reform ratio.” See the discussion in Risinger, supra note
28, at 796-97.
43
This terminology is adopted by virtue of an analogy to “double blind” study
design in various research contexts. In a double blind study, the test subjects do not
know if the “treatment” they are subjected to is the actual test variable or a placebo
(single blind) and the people interacting with the test subjects in the administration of
the test do not know either (double blind). The term “double blind” in the eyewitness
context is a bit out of kilter, since the notion of the original blind (the fact that the
witness does not know specifically which person is the actual suspect) is entailed in the
notion of a line-up style procedure (whether photo or corporeal) to begin with, so it
seems in some ways that the term “blind administration” would be more natural in
capturing the proposed reform, but “double blind administration” has become fairly
standard in the literature.
42
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all. To so argue is akin to arguing that we would be justified in
retaining and not reforming a coin-flipping process in making
selections from line-ups, because otherwise we would lose the
one in X number of identifications that was coincidentally
accurate. And all logistical and cost objections to blind
administration have easy technological responses that render
the objections trivial at best.44 So a combination of formal data
about both the human circumstances that generate misleading
evidence for use and trial, and juror inability to properly
discount such misleading evidence once it reaches them,
together with common sense evaluation of objections to reform,
should lead to both mandated pre-trial procedures, and rules of
exclusion45 to enforce the use of those procedures, all based on
“naturalized reform” principles.
I could go on giving examples, but I won’t. In any case, I
hope to have gone some way toward establishing that only by
utilizing both formal data and critical common sense can a
naturalized approach to rules of exclusion (and the proof
process more generally) be of use in improving the product of
adjudication.

44

See Letter of John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey,
transmitting new statewide line-up identification guidelines to all New Jersey law
enforcement
agencies
2
(April
18,
2001),
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/
agguide/photoid.pdf (requiring blind administration where practicable, and
recommending use of “[t]echnological tools, such as computer programs that can run
photo lineups and record witness identification independent of the presence of an
investigator”).
45
A reader might object that I had gotten away from the specific subject of
exclusionary rules by using an example of reform up-stream from the trial. However, I
have intentionally done this, for a number of reasons. First, in my opinion, if partisan
adversary presentation and argument at the trial can be argued to add epistemic
strength to the results of our trial system, the major epistemic weaknesses of our
current adversary arrangements are the result of party control of the investigation and
development of information for trial. Party interests being what they are, every
opportunity for advantageous selection, distortion and massage is likely to be taken.
The most pressing needs for reform are at this stage, to insure that information is both
complete and as undistorted and uncorrupted as possible. Once we determine what
processes should be mandated to this end, then rules of exclusion at trial (evidence
rules stricti juris) must then be put in place to protect the requirement of the mandated
pre-trial processes—proper manifestations of the best kind of best evidence principle
embraced by Professor Nance. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 227 (1988) for Professor Nance’s classic revitalization of the “best evidence”
concept.

